'The market for a given set of financial instruments and/or services is fully integrated if all potential market participants with the same relevant characteristics (1) face a single set of rules when they decide to deal with those financial instruments and/or services; (2) have equal access to the above-mentioned set of financial instruments and/or services; and (3) are treated equally when they are active in the market.' -Beale et. al (2004) When markets are financially integrated in the sense defined above, the law of one price holds, i.e., all potential agents in both markets 1 will face identical prices for identical assets. This price equalization has important implications for the economy's growth, consumption and output volatility, exposure to crisis and for monetary policy independence through the trilemma 2 . This paper is an attempt to understand the extent to which price integration has progressed in developed and developing economies in the recent decade(s) and the various forces that have helped or hindered this convergence. Price convergence is measured by the index introduced in Pasricha (2008) that captures the size of deviations from covered interest parity as well as the speed of reversion to the no-arbitrage band. In this paper, I construct this index on a yearly basis for 54 countries for an average of 13 years per country 3 , comparing interest rates on interbank loans across countries. Previous attempts at measuring price convergence in financial markets have focused on either average absolute deviations (Chinn- Ito, 2007) which do not capture the speed of arbitrage, or the beta-convergence measure (Baele et. al, 2004) which captures integration between a group of countries but does not allow one to rank different countries on 1 with the same relevant characteristics 2 see Kose et al. [2009] for an excellent survey 3 The list of countries and the years for which data is available are listed in Table 1 1 their degree of convergence. The index developed here is the first time-varying index that allows one to rank countries and takes into account both the size of their no-arbitrage bands 4 and the speed with which the arbitrage occurs, once it is profitable.
Using this measure of price convergence, I explore the factors that contribute to this convergence, or the lack of it. My main focus is on the link between the degree of integration and the competitiveness of the domestic financial sector.
While there is a large literature on the implications of domestic banking sector competitiveness for growth (Claessens and Laeven, 2005; Cetorelli, 2001) , access to finance (Beck et. al, 2004) and stability (Boyd et. al., 2007; Boyd and Nicola, 2005; Allen and Gale, 2004; Hartmann and Carletti, 2002) , the link between the former and the degree of international integration has not been dwelt into. Such a link is important because its existence implies that countries with partially open capital accounts would see greater price convergence with international markets if they liberalized their domestic banking sector, even without opening it to foreign players. They may also try to put sand in the wheels of international capital without appearing to do so, through tightening domestic regulation.
There are several reasons why one would expect a link between domestic financial market structure and international price convergence 5 . Freixas and Holthausen (2005) show that even in the absence of capital controls, when there is asymmetric information between domestic market and foreign market, a segmented market equilibrium may occur, with no interbank activity across the borders. When an integrated equilibrium does occur, the interbank market integration will not be perfect (the interbank rates will not be equalized), even in the presence of correspondent banking. In their model, the signal that banks 4 The no-arbitrage band captures the minimum deviation required for arbitrage to be profitable and increases with the size of transactions costs and capital controls 5 In the absence of capital controls and any kind of friction like asymmetric information that prevents all domestic participants from accessing foreign market and vice versa, priceconvergence will occur, irrespective of the structure of domestic financial markets. It is only when either capital controls or some other frictions are present (as in the real world) that the structure of domestic financial market becomes relevant.
get about foreign banks' type is more noisy than the signal about domestic banks, leading to an interest differential at which a bank may borrow domestically and the interest rate at which it may borrow abroad (or from a correspondent bank that borrows abroad to lend domestically). Adding imperfect competition in domestic banking sector to their model will only exacerbate the domestic-foreign interest differentials and may increase the range of possibilities where a segmented equilibrium is the only possibility. Secondly, market power in the interbank market would lead to greater bid-ask spreads directly (Khemraj and Pasha, 2008; Pasricha, 2008b) and through its impact on market liquidity. Carletti, Hartmann and Spagnolo (2007) show that bank consolidation may lead to greater variance in aggregate liquidity demand and Acharya, Gromb and Yorulmazer (2008) that surplus banks may under provide liquidity when outside options of needy banks are weak. Several empirical studies in the foreign exchange market have shown that thinner markets or those with greater volatility have higher bid-ask spreads (Cheung and Chinn, 2001; Bollerslev and Melvin, 1994) .
The results indeed confirm a strong link between lack of financial sector competitiveness (banking and non-banking) and lack of price convergence, particularly for low and middle income countries. Capital controls explain only a small part of deviations from covered interest parity. Crisis periods and periods of greater volatility see lower de-facto integration.
In the next section, I describe the construction of the index and in section 3, I discuss the trends in financial integration over the sample period. In section 4, I empirically examine the link between domestic financial competitiveness and financial integration. Section 5 concludes. 
where δ t is the covered interest differential, i t+k and i * t+k are respectively returns on comparable domestic and foreign assets between time t and t+k, expressed as per cent per annum. S t is the domestic currency price of foreign currency, F t+k is the forward rate or the k th period domestic currency price of foreign exchange delivered in that period. P is a scaling factor, used to annualized and convert into percentage terms, the first term 6 . Since all the variables in the above equation are known a priori, any deviation from this parity in our model world represents pure profits and therefore cannot exist in equilibrium.
However, as discussed in Frenkel and Levich (1975) and in Pasricha(2008a) , in a world with transactions costs, exchange or capital controls or risk of such controls, differential taxation, the measured covered differential would lie in a no-arbitrage band, even with efficient and risk neutral markets. This happens because the econometrician's measure of covered differential, which is based on the average of the forward and spot rates (rather than the bid-ask rates) and the average of the interest rates does not capture the actual profits, net of taxes and other costs of arbitrage. One should then expect the measured differential, δ to satisfy:
6 for example, if the forward rates are of maturity 1 month, then P = 1200
and the precise forms of κ n and κ p depend on the transactions costs and capital controls (as well as the levels of exchange and interest rates) 7 . The measured deviations within the no-arbitrage bands are therefore, consistent with equilibrium and with covered interest parity, and may be unit root processes. Further, when the supply of arbitrage capital is less than perfectly elastic, due either to quantitative controls, asymmetric information, or imperfect competition in markets, then profitable deviations may not be immediately arbitraged away but in rational markets, would eventually be arbitraged away (Cheng and Cheung, 2008; Fong, Valente and Fun, 2008 ).
Empirical Model for Covered Interest Deviations
These considerations lead one to the choice of an Asymmetric, Self-Exciting Threshold Autoregressive Model (ASETAR) model as the empirical model to estimate the boundaries of the no-arbitrage band (called the thresholds) and
the speed of reversion outside the band. This model is called 'self-exciting' because the thresholds are lags of δ itself, and asymmetric because the negative threshold is allowed to differ from the positive threshold. It takes the form:
where ǫ t ∼ N (0, σ 2 ) and κ n and κ p are the negative and positive thresholds respectively. In theory, the deviations inside the band are unit-root processes, so the model is estimated with ρ i = 1. Note that this model implies that speculative activity will push the deviations to the edges of the band, rather than its center. The hypothesis of efficient arbitrage states that the AR(1) process outside the bands be stationary. If the thresholds were known, the model could 7 These are described in Pasricha(2008a) 5 be estimated by ordinary least squares applied separately to the inner regime and outer regime observations. Since the thresholds are not known, they may be estimated either by a grid search, or by a sequential method suggested in Hansen(1999) that also yields confidence intervals for the thresholds. In this method, a grid search is first made for a single threshold, yielding a minimum residual sum of squares, say S 1 (κ 1 ), where the function S everywhere denotes the residual sum of squares function. In a two regime model, the first search would yield the stronger of the two threshold effects. Fixing the first-stage estimateκ 1 , the second-stage criterion is:
and the second-stage threshold estimate is the one that minimizes the above function, i.e.:κ
The estimate of the first threshold is then refined as follows:
and the refinement estimator for the first threshold is:
As a practical matter, the search is conducted over all unique values of the actual observations between the 5 th and the 95 th percentiles and is restricted so that at least 5% of observations fall in each of the three regimes. When the model is estimated for every year using daily observations, this restricts the minimum number of observations in each regime to be between 10 and 12.
This process of optimization also yields confidence intervals for the thresh-
The asymptotic (1 − α)% confidence intervals for κ 1 and κ 2 are the set of values of each such that L r 1 (κ 1 ) ≤ c(α) and L r 2 (κ 2 ) ≤ c(α). Hansen(1999) also shows that
.
Integration Index
To construct the Integration Index, Pasricha (2008a) This makes the resulting index centered at zero. The normalizations are done separately for the two maturities, one and three months. For countries for which data on one of the maturities is not available, the available maturity's data is used to approximate for the missing maturity model. The Integration Index for 8 Using percentage of observations rather than number of observations takes care of the concern about uneven sample sizes influencing the latter. 9 Note that the paper uses daily data, and thus measured deviations are those that were present at the end of the day.
country j time t, I jt is: 
Data and Results
To construct the index, interest rates on interbank loans of 1 and 3 month matu- The high income countries also see lower variability in their openness. Figure   1 plots the index over time for these country groups. The figure highlights the fact that the level of price convergence is not a slow moving variable. It fluc-
tuates from year to year, even for high income countries, much more than say the degree of legal restrictions. However, it is important to keep in mind that Noteworthy is the large dip in openness in the current crisis. While the high income countries show a positive trend in openness, the same is not true for low and middle income countries.
Determinants of Price Convergence
This section identifies determinants of de-facto openness as measured by price convergence. The emphasis is on the relationship between price convergence and de-jure capital controls and competitiveness of domestic banking sector. I use the following model:
where Index it is the integration index constructed above for country i, time t,
X it are a set of country characteristics, detailed below and t is a time trend. The regressions are estimated using a Prais Winston procedure allowing for panel specific AR (1) I use four different proxies for domestic banking sector competitivenessthe net interest margins which equal the accounting value of banks' net interest revenue as a share of their total assets, bank overhead costs to total assets ratio, return on equity for the banking sector and bank concentration ratio which is the ratio of total assets of the banking sector that are owned by the three largest banks. Each of these variables is from the world bank's financial structure database 10 . A higher level of each of the variables denotes greater monopoly power in domestic banking and therefore should be associated with lower international integration. Neither of these is a perfect measure of competitiveness, however each of these has been used as proxy for the bank competitiveness in the literature and some are better than the others. Banks with market power can charge higher rates of loans and pay lower rates on deposits (Berger and Hannan, 1989; Hannan 1991) . Demirguc, Laeven and Levine (2003) find that regulatory restrictions on banking activity, including freedom of entry and lack of institutional development substantively increase net interest margins. They also find that the net interest margins increase with state control of the banking sector, and decline with development of the stock markets, which would compete with banks as a source of funding. Higher profits of a less competitive industry may be reflected in higher return on equity (ROE) or higher overhead costs (Berger and Hannan, 1998; Jayaratne and Strahan, 1998; Martinez Peria and Mody, 2004) . Bank concentration ratio in theory should be higher for less 10 For more details on the variables and sources, see appendix table. competitive systems but in practice, the evidence is weak. It does not take into account the fact that banks may compete with non-bank financial institutions and with other financial markets or that threat of entry matters for effective competition (Panzar and Rosse, 1987, Claessens and Beck et. al, 2006) .
In order to account for the competition banks may face from non-bank finan- As a proxy for transactions costs in currency markets, I compute the percentage bid-ask spread (as a percentage of mean rate) in the spot exchange rate markets using daily data. An average of these for the year for each currency is included as an explanatory variable (X Spread). One would expect higher average spreads to be associated with lower openness. Similar spreads on interbank interest rates were not available for most of the countries in the sample.
I compute the coefficient of variations in the interbank and average for the 1-and 3-month forward exchange rate markets, as volatility in the markets may be used to proxy for the lack of liquidity in the markets, as well as for the risk premia. The analysis is done first for the entire sample of countries and then for the two groups -high income and Low and middle income countries -separately.
The list of countries included in each group are presented in Table 3 . Table 4 presents the summary statistics of each of the regressors for all countries and by income group. Several of the variables have different mean values by income group. Table 5 presents the results of difference in means tests for some variables of interest, by income group. For each variable of interest, Table 5 presents the results of an OLS regression on the High Income dummy variable and a constant.
The estimated constants are then the mean values of the dependent variable for Low and Middle Income group. High income countries have net interest margins and overhead costs that are significantly lower than low and middle income countries. The return on equity is not significantly different between the two groups, and concentration in banking assets is actually significantly larger for high income countries than for low and middle income countries. This, combined
with the significantly higher level of financial development (non-bank financial sector) in the high income economies, suggests that concentration may not be the best proxy for the level of competitiveness of the banking sector. This is consistent with the results of Claessens and Laeven (2004) who create a measure of bank competitiveness based on contestability of the market and find that it does not negatively relate to concentration. Moreover, the correlation between net interest margins and de-jure controls is -0.45, indicating that countries with greater openness are also one with lower net interest margins and underscoring the validity of net interest margins as a proxy for lack of competitiveness in banking rather than for bank efficiency.
Results on Bank Competition and International Financial Integration

Full Sample
The results of the regressions are presented in Tables 6 to 8 . Table 6 presents Table 6 , column (4) uses the threshold -0.9. This suggests that at low levels of financial development, the coefficient of concentration variable is smaller, 11 The X-standardized coefficient is the beta multiplied by the standard deviation of the Xvariable. 12 For thresholds lower than the 17 th percentile, the coefficient was still negative but not significant, which may be because the number of observations actually used in regressions for which the threshold was not crossed was too low although it is still positive.
The coefficient for de-jure openness is positive and significant and roughly the same size in all columns of Table 6 . The X-standardized coefficient for dejure openness is lower than the one for net interest margins (0.07), but larger than that for overheads. These results indicate that although capital controls do lead to lower price convergence, however, the relationship is far from one to one. This is consistent with the widely held view that market players find ways around controls and with other studies on the effectiveness of capital controls 13 .
Both exchange rate spreads and coefficient of variation in exchange rates enter with a negative sign, as expected and are significant in all regressions in the full country sample, indicating that liquidity and shocks play an important role in determining price-convergence. There is a significant positive trend in openness, indicating that the recent wave of globalization has led to price convergence. Currency crisis are associated with a significant decline in openness, other things being the same, but in the full sample, the same is not true for banking crisis. Table 7 presents the results using data on high income countries only. In this country grouping, the only variables that enter significantly are the level of legal restrictions, a trend and the level of institutional development. All have a positive sign, indicating that the fewer the restrictions on flows and the better the institutions, the higher the level of openness. Given the high level of dejure openness in these countries, it is not surprising that most of the banking competitiveness variables are not significant. As discussed in the introduction, when there are no or few constraints on access to overseas financial markets, the level of banking competition becomes irrelevant. The positive and significant coefficient on return on equity may only reflect greater efficiency in these markets. The R 2 in the high-income country regressions are also quite low.
Results by Income Group
In contrast, the R 2 for low and middle income country sample are very high, around 0.7 for each specification. The banking sector competitiveness indicators, net interest margins, overheads and return on equity, all have negative coefficients that are larger in magnitude than for the full sample, and significant at the 1 percent level. The concentration index is not significant. Currency crisis and greater volatility in the forex markets are both associated with significantly low levels of de-facto openness, whereas both institutional quality and financial development are associated with higher de-facto openness. De-jure restrictions matter, but the coefficients are smaller than for the high income country sample and not always significant. Trade and GDP enter with negative signs and are both significant but that may just reflect the fact that there were several crisis episodes in the emerging markets with higher GDPs and trade-openness in the sample under consideration and that we have a smaller time series for these countries than for higher income countries.
Concluding Remarks
This paper develops a price based measure of financial openness for 54 countries and for an average of 13 years per country. This index captures an important aspect of international financial integration -the degree to which interest rates are aligned with international markets -that has so far been missing in the studies of impact of financial openness on growth, macroeconomic volatility as well as contagion. While there is a clear trend of increasing openness in the high income countries before the onset of current crisis, the same was not true for the developing countries. the benefits from a greater international integration. Schaeck et. al. (2006) find that more competitive banking systems are more stable and Fecht et. al. (2007) that greater international integration of interbank markets enchances resiliance to ideosyncratic shocks. The link between the two may be that more competitive systems are also more integrated with the rest of the world.
The paper also finds that the determinants of price integration differ between developed and developing countries. Periods of volatility and currency crisis are periods of low price-integration for developing countries. Moreover, for this group, while the link between capital controls and price-convergence exists, it is not strong, providing further proof that capital controls do get evaded. In both the developed and developing country samples, greater financial development is associated with greater de-facto openness. Trade openness is not a significant determinant of de-facto integration in developed markets but is associated with lower integration in the developing countries sample. This may be because the study ignores threshold effects. Increasing trade openness may increase convergence but only when the level of de-jure controls are high and when corruption is high. The impact of tightening of capital controls on de-facto integration may also depend on the level of institutional development. These thresholds effects may be a subject of future research. Excluding Malaysia, Thailand and Turkey.
